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euncerned will fix the day anp place for the meeting of the
commission.
"III. That the commission shall be at liberty to request assistance and advice from experts in international law and in land,
naval, and aerial warfare.
" IV. That the commission shall report its conclusions to each of
the powers represented in its membership.
" Those powers shall thereupon confer as to the acceptance of
t1_1e report and the course to be followed to secure the considera':'
tion of its recomll?endations by the other civilized powers.'
The chairman asked whether discussion of the resolution was
desired. No discussion being desired, the delegations were polled,
each voted affirmatively, and the chairman announced that the
resolution had been una~in1ously adopted.
:Che chairman then asked whether there was any further
business.
:\lr. I(ammerer asked whether it would not be advisable to embody this resolution in the text of the agreement in regard to submarines and the use of poisonous gases in warf~re.
l\Ir. Root said he thought lVIr. I(ammerer's suggestion might in-rolve a little difficulty in procedure. Under the provisions regarding subn1arines and gas, the adherence of other powers was to be
immediately requested. He thought that it would be unwise to
complicate that with this other provision, under which there would
be no adherence called for until after a report of the commission
and the acceptance of it by the five powers, after which the -adherence of other powers would be called for. Provisions which
called for no adherence by other powers would thus be put into
the treaty, together with provisions which called for immediate
adherence.
The chairman said that, if there_ was nothing further to be done
at the present time, and if agreeable to the committee, adjournment might be taken. Of course, as soon as the Naval Treaty
was in readiness, the chairman would call a meeting of the
committee.
The cmnmittee then adjourned, subject to the call of the chair.

TWENTIETH MEETING--TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1922, 3.30 P. M.
PRESENy.

United 8tates.-~1r. Hughes, Senator Lodge, 1\11~. Root, Senator
Underwood, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by 1\Ir. 'Vright, :Mr.
Clark.
British Bntpire.-Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden !for Canada),
Senator l'earce (for Australia), Sir John· Salmond (for New ZP.-'1-
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land) , l\1r. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by :r:Ir. Christie, l\Ir.
l\Ialkin, :Mr. l\iousley.
France.-Mr. Jusserand. Accompanied by l\Ir. Kan1merer, l\le.
Ponsot.
Jtaly.-Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Aecompanied by Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, l\1r. Bruno Averardi.
Japan.-Admiral Baron Kato, Baron Shidehara, Mr. Hanihara.
Accompanied by Capt. Uyeda, l\1r. S_ugimura, Mr. Ichihashi.
The secretary general. Accompanied by l\Ir. Cresson, l\Ir.
Pierrepont, l\1r. 'Vilson. l\1r. Camerlynck, interpreter.
1. The twentieth n1eeting of the Committee on Limitation of
Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American
Building on Tuesday, January 31, 1922, at 3.30 p. m.
2. There \vere present: For the United States, lVlr. Hughes, Se'nator Lodge, lVIr. Root, Senator Underwood, Admiral Coontz; for
the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada),
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New
Zealand), lHr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, lHr. .Jusserand;
for Italy, .Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton; for Japan, Admiral Baron
Kato, Baron Shidehara, l\1r. Hanihara.
3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were present: ~.,or the United States, Mr. Wright, l\1r. Clark; for the British Empire, lVIr. Christie, Mr. Malkin, Mr. lVlousley; for France,
Mr. Kamtnerer, l\ir. Ponsot; for Italy, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, l\fr. Bruno Averardi; for Japan, Capt. Uyeda,
Mr. Sugimura, l\ir. Ichihashi.
The secretary general of the conference, assisted by lVIr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont, · and .l\ir. 'Vilson, was present. l\Ir. Camerlynck (interpreter) was also present.
'.rhe chairman, Mr. Hughes, said l1e was glad to be able to report, from the subcon1mittee of fifteen ·which had had in charge
the consideration of the proposals relating to the limitation of
naval armament, that a conclusion had been reached unanimously
and embodied in a proposed naval treaty. He presented the
treaty to the committee. It was somewhat long, and he would not
attempt to read it. He assumed that it had been considered by .
each delegation, as it had been passed upon by the chiefs of delegations, with thei-r experts, meeting in the subcommittee of fifteen.
Of course, if it \Va~ desii.·ed by any of the delegates that the treaty
should be reviewed at this time~ article by article, that course
would be taken. If he was right in the assumption that each
:hief of delegation had been over the treaty with his delegation, the
:hairman assumed that the committee could at once act upon it.
The action he suggested WfiS that the proposed form of treaty, as
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passed by the subcomm:ttee of fifteen, which embodied the con-elusions reached with respect to the limitation of naval armament,
be approved and reported to the conference at the plenary session
-w hich would be held the following day. The chairman asked if
that course was agreeable.
As all delegations assented, the chairman said}t was so ordered.
l\Ir. Jusserand said:
'' l\Ir. President, I beg leaYe to submit to the committee a few
.o.bseryations. I should have liked to have presented them some
time ago, hut circumstances did not permit. There were other
questions that came up besides this one of naval disarmament,
.nnd it was moreover difficult to explain n1yself without getting the
necessary documents which were not very easy to procure.
"In the course of the last few weeks the country that I have
r(~presented in America for nearly 20 years has been censured with
extreme seYerity, and I might use another word. The letters I
lwse been receiving, the articles I have read, the conversations in
-w hich I haYe taken part, all this shows that a very grave misun<.Jc.rstanding is persisting in the minds of many ,as to the ideas of
France, her faith and her aspirations. Many people continue to
believe that although we are poor-and we are poor for reasons
-o f which 've are not ashamed-although we are poor, that we
w·anted to establish a great navy composed of big warships.
Nothing of the kind. 'Ve are thinking only of the future timP
when that might be necessary, and when we might become less
l}liOr, in order that we might resume on the high seas the rank
,,·hich '\ve have ever held.
" To which I shall add: Of the countries which we expected to
approve this ambition, our great maritime neighbor was, in our
opinion, to be the foremost, since there are so many chances that
.our fleet may prove of use to Great Britain, and none I think that
it" should be harmful to her. In the course of the last hundred
~ears three great wars have taken place in the world in which the
];ritish and French fleets have participated, and in these three
·wars they fought side by side for the same cause. Can anything
different be imagined? We .do not think so, we of France. And
eYen if our English friends adopted a different opinion, we would
110t change ours.
'\
" But the chief blame aimed at us has had for its cause the question of the submarines. People continue to be persuaded that we
h~_:.ve a passion for these loathed machines and want to use them
German fashion. All this is chiefly grounded on remarks made
b~· the l11irst Lord of the Admiralty at the sitting of December 30;
they had an immense effect, still lasting, and were very hurtful to
:us. They were based on an article by Commander Castex, published in January, 1920, which is now famous but was not before,
.nnd I had trouble to find a copy to read.
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" I lun·e done so and found that, as for the tone of the article,
The author passes sweeping judgments
on n1any 1nen and problen1s, and there are a number of points on
"\\ hich I disagree with him. He. obviously finds pleasure in upsetting commonly prevailing ideas; he generously distribute$ blame
to many, to the English, to the Germans, to the French.
"As to the substance o~ the article, its purpose-\vhich could not
be suspected from the extracts read to this committee-is to show
the uselessness of privateering- and "guerre de course" under any
form, unless the country that has recourse to it is in actual possession of the high seas, through the nun1ber and force of her main
ships. The author glances at the past, examines the fate of the
great perturbers of the peace throughout ages, \Vho thought
they could win through their corsairs. But they lost the game.
Vlhether they used wood or steel ships, sailing vessels or steamships, surface or sub1narine - - v essels, all under the same delusion,
lacking a big fleet, they failed. He quotes the example of Louis
XIV~ of Napoleon the First, of the South in the Civil War, and
lnstly of the Germans in the great war, concluded by our common
Ylctory.
" Such is the purpose of the article. The quotations made
from it by Lord Lee had for their object, I take it, to prove
against Commander Castex, and as a consequence against 'oU:r
naval authorities, not to say against France herself, ·four
things:
v
"First, that Capt. Castex is in favor of the hated submarine,
the suppression of \Vhich is demanded by Great Britain from
motives of humanity. Capt. Castex's belief is, as I have said,
that the submarine may be useful to those who hold the mastery
of the seas, an opinion which is not unfavorable to Great Britain. l-Ie is not, moreover, the only one to think that this device
must continue to exist. In support of this assertion I beg to
quote an authority which certainly our British friends "\Viii not
decline to accept.
" ' To go to the other extreme, as "\Vas suggested in some quarters. after the armistice, and prohibit submarines altogether, i~
an equally. unacceptable proposal. It is clear that, as in the
case of mines, the weaker naval States would never consent to
forego the right to employ such a useful defensive "\veapon as the
submarine. l\1oreover, the idea of submersible \Varships is still
comparatively new, and · future developments may entirely_ change
the aspect of this question.. The only reasonable attitude to
adopt is to insist that such vessels shall be subject to the san1e
rules of warfare as any other type of "\varship.'
"This is drawn from the Law of Naval '\Varfare by J. A. Hall,
lecturer on international law to admirn:ls' secretaries' course,
Portsmouth, se<:ond edition, London, 1021, p. 77.
it is_rather paradoxical.
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'' Second, Commander Castex is charged with seeing in the
submarine a \veapon for 11.,rance-for urigrateful, therefore, and
perfidious France-to smash the naval power of her present ally
Great Britain. Lord Lee quoted a paragraph as follows:
"'Thanks to the submarine, after many centuries of effort,
thanks to the ingenuity of man, the instrument, the system, the
martingale is a~ hand which will overthrow for good and all the
naval power of the British Empire.'
" Lord Lee then spoke as follows :
·"'I have quoted this because, as I say, they are the utterances
of a responsible member of the French naval staff, who at the
time of writing was in a high position and was the actual head
of a bureau.
"'These things are)\:nown to our naval staff of course; indeed
they were published to the world under the authority of the
French naval staff.'
"The \Vords 'will o\erthrow for good and all the naval power
of the British Empire,' are not the words of a Frenchman! nor
words that any Frenchman would approve. The quotation as
given by Lord Lee began by three words indispensable for the
understanding of the whole, which he did not incl!Jde. They
were : ' This is the way the Germans are reasoning.' Con1mander
Castex was citing the point of view of the Germans, not the
point of view of the French. The mistake is the more difficult
to understand since not once but twice Commander Castex took
the saine precaution, saying on the preceding page: , ' For our
enem~es these ships did represent; or a,t least they thought so, the
new engine, the technical and material upsetting that was going
to make every old teaching obsolete.'
"l\Iore than that, the very title of the article leaves no doubt
as to its purport. In its complete form, which had not been
quoted, it reads, ' Synthesis of submarine warfare-Characteristics of the German submarine warfare.' If, therefore, on account of those lines of Commander Castex cause for anxiety is
found about something, it must be about the German enemies and
not the French friends of Great Britain.
" Third, Commander Castex has been represented as approving
of the infamous use made of submarines by Germany. All
should be at a loss to understand how this claim could have been
made, since the French officer expressed himself formally, clearly,
and peremptorily in the opposite sense. After having said that
the Germans could not be blamed simply because. they used the.
submarine, he adds : ' The only reproach that can be set up
against them is to have too frequently and in too many particular
cases smeared their flag by conducting submarine warfare with
harbarity and with an aggravation of odious acts. A useless
lind, moreove1·, a stupid cruelty, for it served in no way the pur-
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pose of the war, and because in the end it turned against their
own interest by raising against then1 the unanimous condemnation of the consc·ence of the civilized people of the world.'
''Am I not entitled to maintain not only that Con1mander Castex was not approving of these Gern1an ways and means but that
te expressly condemned thern?
" Comn1ander Castex was also stated by Lord Lee to have made
his own the views of Admiral Au be (a man of wild theories, whom
I have well known, who, desiring the end of all wars, fancied
that the ruthless use of torpedo boats would bring that to pass),
but Con1n1ander Castex did not approve those views, he just
blamed them, a d:fference worth noting.
"Fourth, it has also been said that Commander Castex was
probably teaching in the French naval schools the theories thus
attributed to him; and it has been said in such unkind and cruel
words that my heart is still bleeding at the thought of them.
Those '"'words were as follows :
" 'Now, this officer, who is appo:nted principal lecturer to the
.Een:or officers' course, will, no doubt, unless a change of policy
takes place, be pouring what we regard as this infamy and this
:poison into the ears of the serving officers of the French navy.'
"The answer to ~this," lVIr. Jusserand continued, "is twofold
and simple enough. There is no need for us to change our policy.
Commander Castex can not teach ·what has been called that
infamy, first, because he detests it; second, because his· course of
lectures has nothing to do with submarines, his subject being the
-o rganization of the general staff.
"The subject ...-is 'SO -grave that I want to let you know: what is
.actually taught in French naval schools as to the submarine and
the German way of using it. The following extract will enlighten
you:
" 'The submarine weapon has turned round against the raving
maniacs who employed it and Germany's misfortune came not
only from the defeat of her land armies, but in a very large
measure from the incomprehension of those who, in her camp,
have ordered it.
;
" 'The privateers' war is forbidden in the form which has been
given it by the Germans. That the Germans may have consid·e red the most solemn engagements as scraps of paper. is their
business. But it does not behoove Frenchmen to follow such
shameful examples. The life of human societies, like that of
men, rests on good faith, and the French have too often shown
other people how loyal one should be to give up now, under the
effect of surprise caused by the submarine \var, give up what has
been their glory in the past and may be again, I am persuaded,
their force in the future.'
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"It has been said," continueu l\1r. Jusserand, "that the article
of Commander Castex was well known to the British naval staff.
l\lay I express regret that such lessons as are being given by
Capt. Laurent, the author of the passage I have just quoted,
a:Hl the subject of whose lectures is naval strategy, have apparently remained unknown to the same staff. The lesson I quoted
caD not be supposeu to have had anything to do with the present
discussion, for it was taught on June 1, 1920, and appears in
Commander Laurent's printed text, volume II, page 107.
"In conclusion, I believe I am justified in saying that neither
the infamy wrongly ascribed to Commander Castex nor any
other is taught or ever shall be taught in any of those French
naYal schools from whence con1e the comrades of war that have
fallen of late by the side of American and British officers and
those of the other allied nations; nothing of the kind has ever
teen taught and never shall be.
" I beg to add one word. In the session of the 23d of December
the chief of the British delegation-to whom I am bound by a
friendship so ancient that since we began to know each other
people were born who. had time to grow up and' cover themselves
vvith glory in the course of the last war-mentioned that Great
Britain alone was sufficiently equipped to combat submarine warfare, thanks to her gallant coast population, her fishermen, so
expert in everything that concerns life at sea; and he said that
Great Britain had used 3,676 submarine chasers, to the immense
advantage of France, who had only 257, and that should the
necessity eYer again arise Great Britain would ha.ve to protect
France again. On this point I collected information and found
that at the beginning of the war all who could bear a rifle were
sent to the front, and a good many of our sailors and fishermen are now sleeping their last sleep, not in the sea or along the
coast, but in the trenches, facing north or east, facing Belg~um
and .AJsace.
"'Vhen the pitiless submarine war was started by Germany we
set to work and did our best to meet this new danger, helping
ourselves and the common cause. We are still filled with admiration for England's sailors. All the world knows of our feelings
for those gallant and heroic men at home, on the sea; a model of
all nations. From common testimony, however, our population
also, our Bretons and Normans, Gascons and Provencals did
creditably, and they manned in 'the perilous waters of western or
southern Europe not 257 ships but over 1,300.
" Our British friends, who live in a country of fair play while
we live in the country of 'franc jeu,' will not find it amiss if
I have found it necessary to present these few remarks. It is
because we attach so much value to the friendship and considera-
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tion of the great people that the British are that I have thought
these rectifications indispensable."
Lord Lee said he was not a·ware that the matter just discussed
was to be raised at that time, and therefore he was not in a
position to reply in the detailed ·way which might have been possible if he had had with him the. relevant papers or the actual
articles to which lHr. Jusserand had referred. In any case, he
did not think it would be necessary, in what he had to say, to
take up point .bY point the various criticisms which 1\:Ir. Jusserand
was good enough to make of his previous speech, and which Lord
Lee took, if he might say so entirely in good part. He regarded
l\fr. Jusserand, of course, as fully justified in putting forward the
opposite view. Still less had Lord Lee any desire to resurrect a
controversy which could i_n any way impair the good relations
which existed and which he hoped would always exist between
their two countries.
He had to confess, however, that he was a little ~urprised at
what seemed to him the whole-hearted and almost vehement
defense which l\1r. Jusserand had undertaken of the article ·which
had been written by Commander Castex. It was true that Mr.
Jusserand had said, at the comp1encement of his remarks, that
there were certain passages with which he did not agree, but
Lord Lee thought l\1r. Jusserand would also adn1it that the
burden of his speech that afternoon had been substantially a
defense of the theories and the attitudes taken up by Capt.
Castex in his article. He did not know ·whether his eolleagues
had all had ·a'n opportunity to read the article as a whole, but
·w hatever might be the opinion with regard to this or that individual passage-and he would come to that in a n1o1nent-there
could be no question whatsoever that the main thesis of the artic'le,
that its main purpose was, in the first place, to point out that
the characteristics of Gern1an sub1narine warfare, that is to say,.
" unlimited submarine warfare," \Vere inevitable in the circumstances of the late war and that the critics who denounced them
were real1y taking up an unreasonable and almost absurd position. Capt. Castex ridiculed the objections to these methods <?f
warfare, and even werit so far as to claim that they had originated on the French side of the Rhine, like, ~s he said, so many
other good ideas which the Germans had adopted. That vvas the
general tone and the whole tenor of the article.
He could not believe, although his knowledge of :r·r ench ~atu
r ally did not equal that of M. Jusserand's, that there was any
other possible interpretation of t.he whole spirit of the article,
however full it n1ight be of varadoxical observations. He suggested tlw.t it was a Vt}t•y dan.gerous thing to indulge quite so
libei·ally in varadoxes on su~h a subject as this distinguished
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naval authority appeared to have done. It led to ambiguities and
to misunderstandings, possibly of a very serious character.
His main point wns-and he was prepared, of course, if he l1a<l
misrepresented any particular passage or the bearing of any particular passage-to withdraw any observation that he might have
made u110n it; but he did not withdraw for one moment the general feeling of condemnation and horror which be thought anyone
reading the article as a whole must have felt for the views which
Capt. Castex there expressed ... and championed. He was glad to
see, moreover, that they were condemned by no one in more vigorous terms than by Capt. Castex's brother officer, Admiral de Bon,
who described them as "monstrosities "-that was his phrase, if
he recalled it aright; ai.1d it was a!'most as promptly, at any rate
on the first opportunity, repudiated in the most formal manner
by l\1. Sarraut, speaking on behalf of the French Government. It
was, therefore, expressly condemned in the first place by the great
s~rvice to which Capt. Castex belonged, a~d secondly, by the accredited representative of the French Government.
Directly that was done, Lord Lee took the ,first opportunity,
here in this room, of accepting, in the 1nost whole-hearted way, the
repudiation by the French Government of the article and the sentime:l,ts contained in it. He further expressed the hope that the
incident would be regarded as satisfactorily closed; and was so
given to understand in the reply which M. Sarraut was good
enough to make on that occasion.
Xot having the article here, and not knowing the subject was
coming up this afternoon, Lord Lee was not in a position to
analyze the 11articular passages ·which M. Jusserand had just
quoted, but his own view was that although some of them may
possibly have been conceived in the spirit of paradox, they are
also ambiguous, and that whatever might be M. Jusserand's view
of them,· from reading the article, Lord Lee could not conceive any
doubt whatsoever as to what was in the mind of Capt. Castex,
and that was that he was a 'whole-hearted supporter of the necessity of the German system of unlimited submarine warfare, \vhich
had been stigmatized as piracy by this conference in the formal
resolutions proposed by l\:Ir. Root.
:\I. .Jusserand made it a further cause of offense that be, Lord
Lee, suggested that Capt. Castex might be teaching these views to
the officers' course, of which he has been appointed a principal
lecturer. 'Veil, if an officer held views of that character, which
Capt. Castex thought of sufficient importance, and which were
deemed of sufficient importance to be published in the representative service technical publication "under the authority of the
general staff "-although they were careful in all such cases to
say they did not necessarily take responsibility for what was
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said-it \Vas a fair assumption that, holding those views, and having expressed them so prominently, Capt. Castex should continue
to expound them to the officers to whom he lectured in the course
of his duty. Lord Lee was very glad to know that such was not
to be the case, as it obviously could not now be the case, in view
of both the professional and the political repudiation of those
views by the Government under which Capt. Castex served.
He said that M. Jusserand had then spoken of another matter.
He had talked of the part that France had played in the late war
on the seas. No one who had not, like Lord Lee, had the honor of
representing the British Admiralty, could know what a great part
France had played, to the utmost limit of her ability. Nothing,
the speaker said, was further from his intention, or that of Mr ..
Dalfour, than to suggest the smallest reproach of France for not
having been able, with all her other obligations, to put forth a
greater effort for the suppression of the submarine. All knew she
did her utmost. But this must be said in regard to the late controversy on the submarine: The situation of the late war might
occur again in years to come. In that war practically the whole
burden of dealing with the submarine menace which had affected
France, as it had affected Great Britain, was thrown upon the
latter power. He remembered Admiral de Bon saying that no one
could recall without profound emotion· the sacrifices, burdens, and
anxieties that were thrown upon Great Britain as the result of
that submarine campaign. In these circumstances, and knowing
how nearly that campaign had succeeded, he must remind France
that Great Britain might not be in a position to do it again,
and to put forth another effort sufficient to defend both France
and herself. He had therefore ventured to urge, in the interest of
both their countries, that submarines should be suppressed altogether, because without that suppression that perilous situation
might recur.
•
That was the main, and the stated, reason for the desire of the
British to abolish submarines, and that was why the British Empire delegati&n regretted so deeply that France, knowing all the
circumstances, should have refused their request and should have
insisted upon forcing this in tolerable burden upon them in a
future war, if the circumstances should recur.
Lord Lee did not want to embark upon what might be considered a controvers~onal reply to l\1. Jusserand about France's
desire not to increase her naval armaments. He knew nothing
of the desire or motives of France in tliat matter. All the British
Empire delegation said was that as a matter of fact France was
p_roposing to treble her existing fleet of submarines. They objected strongly to that, and they had stated their objections,
and they did not wish, on this occasion, to enlarge upon them
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again. rr~lley, on the other hand, desired in every way to limit
armament. They had reduced tl1eir own navy drastically, at this
eonference, and had gone further, since the commencement of the
conference, to show their good will and their desire to assist
France and to relieve her from these unnecessary burdens. They
had offered ller a guarantee by the whole of their armed forces
by ·land, sea, and air, to protect her against any aggression on her
coasts. They had done everything that was possible in that way
to s~ww their good will and good faith, and they had desired in
all these matters to wo1·1{ with and to assist France. Therefore,
lle would say as a final word, and with an apology to his colleagues for having detained them so long, that he des~red from the
depths of his heart to see not only maintained but improved the
good relations that existed between Great Britain and her great
neighbor across the Channel, and it was the desire of his country,
and certainly his own desire, that no word should be said that
could in any way impair that good feeling. He hoped, just as
his French friends and Allies. hoped, that Great Britain and
France should go forward together in these matters, not only
as friends and Allies, but hand in hand for the 'reconstruction of
Europe and civili~ation.
l\1r. Jusserand said " I shall say only on(~ word. I note ·with
profound satisfaction the last remark made by the First Lord of
the Admiralty. 'Vith that I agree from my heart and I may
assure him that all my compatriots will. But I can not admit
the statement that if the submarine be preserved it is owing to
France; one more of those many unpleasant things reported as.
having been caused by France, when such is not the case. As a
matter of fact the vote against the British proposal was unanimous, including the United States, both through their delegation
and their unanimous advisory committee. Lord Lee has again
spoken of our intention of building a large number of submarines.
"\\'~' e shall in reality b~ild them or not in accordance with our
needs and our means. That Commander Castex really condemned
the submarine, German fashion, I can not better prove than by
reading again the passage quoted a moment ago."
Lord Lee interrupted to say: "I only say he cited those special
occasions as· having spoiled the German case, which he otherwise
thought was a good one."
l\lr. Jusserand then remarked " I don't understand it that
\Vay," and continued with his speech:
"'Vhat I said of the paradoxical disposition of Commander
Castex referred chiefly to his sweeping historical remarks, like
those on ' perturbers ' being represented as always mystical. 1 do
not belieYe Napoleon was, nor Julius Caesar. As for the condemnation of Commander Castex by l\1r. Sari·aut and Admiral
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de Bon, both condemned what was unexpectedly quoted of him,
n'either knowfng then the real text. But I do not desire to insist .
. \Vith Lord Lee, I am ready to leave the question to the judgment
of our colleagues when they have a chance of reading the whole
article under discussion. Allow me to close by repeating that,
of the words uttered . in this controversy, the last pronounced
by Lord Lee are the ones which I chiefly want to remember."
The chairman called attention to the fact that there was still
one matter which, perhaps, might be passed upon that afternoon.
He brought this before the committee, knowing the general
desire to conclude its work and hoping to assist, if possible, in
attaining that end. This was a draft of a proposed treaty which
embodied the resolutions previously adopted with respect to subnlarines and poison gas. He understood that the French text
had received the approval of 1\tlr. I(ammerer of the French delegation.
Inasmuch as this treaty contained nothing new, the substantive
matte~ being the resolutions which had been adopted and the
formal matters being conventional, he would, with the committee's
consent, read it. If the committee should desire to take it under
further consideration, that would be done. If not, perhaps the
committee would authorize its presentation at the plenary session
the fol~owirig day.
The chairman then read the draft treaty, as follows:
" The United States of America, ,the British Empire, France,
Italy, and Japan, hereinafter referred to as signatory powers,
desiring to make more effectively the rules adopted by civilized
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, and to prevent the use in war of
noxious gases and chemicals, have determined to ·conclude a
treaty to this effect, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries
(and so forth).
"Who, having communicated their full po\vers, found in good
and clue fonn, have agreed as follows:
"I.

"The signatory po\vers declare that among the rules adopted by
civilized nations for the· protection of the lives of neutrals and
noncombatants at sea in time of war, the following are to be
deerned an established part of international law.:
"(1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and
search to determine its character before it can be seized.
"A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to
submit to visit and search after warning, or to vroceed as directed
after seizure.
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"A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and
passengers have been first placed in safety.
"(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any 4f"Circumstances
exempt from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine
can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules
the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and
from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed
unmolested.
" II.
"The signatory powers invite all other civilized powers to
·e xpress their assent to the foregoing statement of established law
so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout the
world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of
the W«?rld is to pass judgment upon future belligerents.
"III.

"The signatory po\vers, desiring to insure the enforcement of
the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to
attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships,
further declare that any person in the service of any power who
shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is
under orders .of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have
violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may be brought to trial before
the civil or military authorities of any power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found.
"IV.

" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of
using submarines as con1merce destroyerf? without violating, as
they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection
of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that
the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers
shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations they
no\v accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between
themselves and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto.

"v.
" The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases,
and all analogous liqu:ds, materials, or devices, having been justly
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a
prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which
: t majority of the civil:zed powers are parties,
25882-23--17
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" The signatory po,vers, to the end that this prohibition shall
be universally accepted as a part of international law, binding
alike the con~cience and 'practice of nations, declare their assent
to such prohibition, agree to be bound ·thereby as between themselves, and invite all otlYer civilized nations to 'adhere thereto.
"VI.

"The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the signatory powers
and shall take effect on the deposit of all the ratifications, 'vhich
shall take ·place at 'Vashington.
" The Government of the United States of America ·will transmit to- all the signatory po,vers a certified copy of the procesYerbal of the deposit of ratifications.
"The present treaty, in Fr<;nch and in English, shall ren1ain
deposited in the archives of the GoYernment of the United States
of America, and duly certified copies thereof vv;ll be transmitted
by that Government to each of the signatory powers.
"VII.

" The Government of the United States of A1nerica will further
transmit to each of the nonsignatory powers a duly certified copy
of the present tre~ty and invite its adherence :thereto.
"Any nonsignatory ppwer 1nay adhere to the present treaty by
communicating an instrun1ent of adherence to the Government of
the United States of America, which will thereupon transmit to
each of the signatory and adhering powers a certified copy of
each instrument of adherence.
" In faith whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have
signed the present treaty.
"Done at the city of Washington the
day of February,
1922."
The chairman stated that this vvas not presented for discussion
at this time. It had been drawn by 1\fr. Root, and the chairman
understood that it follo,ved the text of the resolutions precisely,
except in conventional matters, such as the introduction and conclusion. ff any delegates desired this to be held over," it would
be held over. If, however, the committee was ready to have it
go in in that form, it would be presented at the next plenary session and that much more would be out of the way.
He asked the pleasure of the committee.
Mr. Balfour said that he 'vas much embarrassed about this.
He agreed, of course, to the substance of all the chairman had
read. There 'vas a question, however, that he would like to ask
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l\lr. Root He asked if that would be in order and wa s a ssured
that it ·would.
Continuing, l\ir. Balfour said the question had been raised that
morning at a meeting of the British delegation, and the point
vvas this: The proposed treaty seemed to be perfectly clear and
satisfactory as between the powers represented at this table.
The difficulty was as follows : He· was afraid it was very easy to
conceiYe a case in ·which, for instance, one of the five powers
represented around this table might be at war with another
signatory po·wer having as an ally some nation not agreeing to
the treaty. An ambiguous and difficult situation would result.
He ·would like l\ir. Root's opinion upon a. point which seemed,
at least to some of his friends, not to be without difficulty and
embarrassment. '.rhe apparent difficulty would ·be almost unthinkable. It would mean one of these countries represented at
this table being at war ·with another power at the table, who
had an ally not represented at the table. He did not mean to
press the matter, but he was given to understand that that was a
point that was in the minds of many. He did not think it haa
receiYed much consideration, and as the treaty would have to run
the gauntlet of many severe criticisms, like other treaties, he
\vould like to know what M_r. Root's advice on the point was.
l\lr. Root said he thought that was one of the things which it
·w as quite impossible to provide for in the treaty. No agreen1ent
could be made in the application of which questions would not
arise in the future. If the n1embers of the committee were to
try to guard against all conceivable situations to which this
agreement between them was to be applied, they would make a
treaty as long as the moral law. Now, they were making this
treaty between then1selYes and they must assume that it would
be carried out in good faith. If another power that was not
bound by the treaty should come ·along and create a situation
to which the treaty did not apply, then it would not apply; but
that would have to be determin~d by the conditions and the facts
as they arose. He could not believe that there would be any
real embarrassment.
l\1r. Balfour said that he would not press the 1natter.
Senator Schanzer stated that the Italian delegation shared the
anxleties to which l\fr. Balfour referred, and he thought that he
had raised very opportunely the question concerning the execution of the treaty in the case of war with a power which had
neith~r signed nor adhered to the treaty itself.
If one of the five
great signatory powers should find itself in war with another
of the five signatory powers and the latter should be allied with a
nonsignatory or nonadherent power, it was clear that the first-
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n1entioned power could not afford to find itself bound by the
dut:es imposed by the treaty. In effect, the nonsignatory or nonadherent powers 'vould be free to make unlimited use of submarines, poisonous gases, etc., and would do it not ·only in its
own interest, but also in the interest of the great po,vers to which it was allied. He wished to repeat that in these conditions it was
~lear that the execution of the provisions of the treaty would
~ease to be effective.
He could agree with Mr. Root that it was
not absolutely indispensable to provide for this case by a special
stipulation in · the treaty, but it was nevertheless desirable that
the interpretation given to-day should be registered in the minutes of the committee.
The chairman stated that what had been said would be recorded in the minutes. He asked if the committee was ready to
act upon the treaty and to accept it for submission at the next
-plenary session. All assented, and he declared further that the
treaty was accepted and that course would be taken.
He then asked if the committee would consent to adjourn, so
that a n1eeting of the Far Eastern committee might be held.
Sir John Sahnond said he would like to raise one question
before adjournment; that was whether these two treaties were
to be given any distinguishing title or name by the committee.
·There were to be a number of treaties, and there ought to be
some method of referring to them in public and of distinguishing them.
The chairman said that had been considered and it was thought
inadvisable to put in the treaty anything li~e a popular name;
but the treaties would be given nam_es by the public just the
same. Of course, already there was the name " The Four Power
Treaty." 'I'here was the preamble which expressed the purpose
of the treaty, to reduce the burdens of competition in naval
:armament. Of course, there would be the naval armmnent treaty
and then tbe submarine treaty, as he supposed it would popularly
be called. In other words, while it might not be just the thing
for the committee to c1esignate the treaties by any popular name,
some appropriate rlame for them would undoubtedly be adopted.
He suggested that the committee might leave it to the public
to name them.
Sir John Salmond thought the comn1ittee should not leave it
to the public to nan1e the treaties, but should name them itself,
.and asked if there was any objection to adding a subclause giving
them a recognized name, or to clTecting the same purpose by a
resolution of the committee, that this should be known as so:and-so; for instance, the "Naval Treaty of \Vashington," and the
second treaty as the "Declaration of Washington," not as the
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submarine treaty, but as the "Declaration of Washington," corresponding to the Declaration of Paris or the Declaration of
London. In the same way the treaty with respect to the Pacific
might be appropriately termed the \Vashington-Pacifie treaty
rather than the four power treaty or the four power pact, or
some other popular name or misnomer that the newspapers might
choose. He _suggested that the committee itself ought to take
the responsibility of naming and christening its work.
The chairman said that to bring this to a point-and he did
not desire to be considered as hurr~ring the committee, but he
was under obligation to release eertain delegates as soon as possible-he would assume that Sir John Salmond had moved that the
first treaty be regarded as the "Naval Treaty of \Vashington,"
and asked if the committee was ready to act upon it.
Senator Schanzer stated that he did not agree with Sir John
Salmond's view that it was a tradition to give a name to a treaty,
but that a treaty was na1ned by the place, the date, and the
parties that took part. It seemeu to him there was no necessity
for christening the1n, or at least it was not done ip. other countries.
The chairman said he understood that the Italian delegation
voted "No" on the proposal of Sir John Salmon. (Senator Schanzer indicated that the chairman's understanding was correct.)
This was a tribunal-and he had in mind a legal friend who, he
kne\v, would like to be a member of such a tribunal-where the
dissenting opinion was the prevailing opinion. He declared the
motion lost. He added that whether the committee resolved or
did not resolve, these treaties would be named, and all the members of the committee could do, in his opinion, was to be as good
prophets as possible in trying to hit the names that the public
would adopt.
The committee then adjourned subject to the call of the Chair,
and the chairman asked the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern
Questions to assemble.
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